We examine so-called product-games with an aperiodic transition structure, with respect to the average reward, for which we present an approach based on communicating states. For the general n-player case, we establish the existence of 0-equilibria. In addition, for the special case of two-player zero-sum games of this type, we show that both players have stationary 0-optimal strategies.
Introduction.
Stochastic games and product-games. An n-player stochastic game is given by (1) a set of players N = 1 n , (2) a nonempty and finite set of states S, (3) for each state s ∈ S, a nonempty and finite set of actions A i s for each player i, (4) for each state s ∈ S and each joint action a s ∈ × i∈N A i s , a payoff r i s a s ∈ to each player i, (5) for each state s ∈ S and each joint action a s ∈ × i∈N A i s , a transition probability distribution p sa s = p sa s t t∈S .
The game is to be played at stages in in the following way. Play starts at stage 1 in an initial state, say in state s 1 ∈ S. In s 1 , each player i ∈ N has to choose an action a has to be chosen by each player i in state s 2 . Then, given action combination a 2 = a 1 2 a n 2 , player i receives payoff r i s 2 a 2 and the play moves to some state s 3 according to the transition probability distribution p s 2 a 2 , and so on. We assume complete information (i.e., the players know all the data of the stochastic game), full monitoring (i.e., the players observe the present state and the actions chosen by all the players), and perfect recall (i.e., the players remember all previous states and actions).
A Markov transition structure i for player i ∈ N is given by (1) i . Note that, if we also assigned a payoff in every state to every action, then we would obtain the well-known model of Markov decision problems for player i.
We will now consider a special type of n-player stochastic games, called product-games, in which the transition structure is derived by taking the product of n Markov transition structures. A product-game G, associated to the Markov transition structures 1 2 n , is an n-player stochastic game for which (1) the set of players is N = 1 n (2) the state space is S = S 1 × · · · × S n (3) the action set for each player i ∈ N in each state s = s n that may depend on all n current states as well as on all n actions chosen by the players. Product-games have been introduced in Altman et al. [1] , although in a somewhat different fashion. They only examine two-player games in which the sum of the payoffs is always equal to zero (zero-sum games), and drop the assumption of full monitoring by letting each player only observe his own coordinate of the present state and only the action chosen by himself. As a result, both players have to make choices without noticing anything about the other player's behavior. They show that a linear programming formulation is sufficient to solve these games; i.e., to find the value and stationary optimal strategies (cf., the definitions below).
Note that the class of product-games, as defined in our paper, differs essentially from other known classes of n-player stochastic games. Stochastic games with a single controller; i.e., when one player controls the transitions, however, fall into the class of product-games. Indeed, a stochastic game that is controlled by player i can be seen as a product-game in which S j is a singleton for all players j = i. Finally, we wish to mention the class of stochastic games with additive transitions (AT-games, cf., Flesch et al. [8] ); i.e., when the transitions are additively decomposable into player-dependent components, in contrast with a product decomposition. Not surprisingly, the structure of product-games and AT-games differ essentially, and product-games require new ideas and an entirely different approach.
From now on, we will consequently use the upper-index for the player and the lower-index for the state. Whenever one of them is omitted, we will then mean a vector in the case of quantities and a product in the case of sets, for all possible players or states, respectively. For example, A i denotes × s∈S A i s . Finally, we denote the set of opponents of any player i by −i = N − i . Then, −i in the upper-index will mean a vector or product for all players j = i. For example, S A joint stationary strategy x = x i i∈N induces a Markov-chain on the state space S with transition matrix P x , where entry s s of P x gives the transition probability p sx s s for moving from state s to states when the joint mixed action x s is played in state s. With respect to this Markov-chain, we can speak of transient and recurrent states. A state is called recurrent if, when starting there, play will eventually return to that state with probability 1; otherwise the state is called transient. If play is in a recurrent state, then this state will be visited infinitely often with probability 1, while transient states can only be visited finitely many times, with probability 1. We can group the recurrent states into minimal closed sets, so-called ergodic sets. An ergodic set is a collection F of recurrent states with the property that, when starting in any of the states in F , all states in F will be visited infinitely often and the play will remain in F forever with probability 1.
Strategies
Let
the limit is known to exist (cf., Doob [4] , Theorem 2.1, p. 175). Entry s s of the stochastic matrix Q x , denoted by q sx s , is the expected frequency of stages for which the process is in states when starting in s. The matrix Q x has the well known properties (cf., Doob [4] ) that
Rewards. For a joint strategy = i i∈N and initial state s ∈ S, the sequences of payoffs are evaluated by the (expected) average reward, which is given for player i by
where R i m is the random variable for the payoff for player i at stage m, and where Ɛ s stands for expectation with respect to the initial state s and the joint strategy . We wish to remark that all our further results hold for the limsup as well.
With regard to a joint stationary strategy x = x i i∈N , we obtain more explicit formulas for the average reward. Let r i s x s denote the expected immediate payoff for player i in state s if the joint mixed action x s is played. By definition, for the average reward of every player i we have
hence by (2) we also obtain
Every player i has a pure stationary best reply against any fixed joint stationary strategy of his opponents (cf., Blackwell [2] , Hordijk et al. [11] ); i.e., for any
for all initial states s ∈ S and for all strategies i ∈ i . For any player i ∈ N and initial state s ∈ S, let 
which is an easy consequence of the definition of v i s and Equality (4) . Furthermore, by Thuijsman and Vrieze [23] (their proof is given for only two players but directly extends to the n-player case in combination with Neyman [14] , who showed that the min max levels equal the limit of the discounted min max levels in n-player stochastic games), there always exists an initial state s in the set t ∈ S v i t = min t ∈S v i t for which players −i have a joint stationary strategy x −i such that
s for all strategies i for player i. In other words, the infimum in expression (6) is attained for state s at stationary strategies.
Equilibria. A joint strategy = i i∈N is called a (Nash) -equilibrium for initial state s ∈ S, for some ≥ 0, if
which means that no player can gain more than by a unilateral deviation. If is an -equilibrium for all initial states, then we call an -equilibrium. It is clear from the definition of the min max level v that if is an -equilibrium, then Regarding general stochastic games, the famous game called the big match, which was introduced by Gillette [10] and solved by Blackwell and Ferguson [3] , and the game in Sorin [21] demonstrated that 0-equilibria do not necessarily exist with respect to the average reward. They made it clear, moreover, that history-dependent strategies are indispensable for establishing -equilibria, for > 0.
For two-player stochastic games, Vieille [24, 25] managed to establish the existence of -equilibria, for all > 0. However, little is known about n-player stochastic games, and it is unresolved whether they always have -equilibria, for all > 0. This is probably the most challenging open problem in the field of stochastic games. For the class of n-player aperiodic product-games, we will answer this question in the affirmative by proving the existence of 0-equilibria (cf., Main Theorem 1). Here aperiodicity refers to an aperiodic transition structure and will be given a precise definition later.
Zero-sum games and optimality. In the development of stochastic games, a special role has been played by the class of zero-sum stochastic games, which are two-player stochastic games for which r 2 s a s = −r 1 s a s (meaning that the sum of the payoffs is zero), for each state s and for each joint action a s . In these games the two players have completely opposite interests. Mertens and Neyman [13] showed that for such games v 2 = −v 1 . Here v = v 1 is called the value of the game. They also showed that, if instead of using liminf one uses limsup in the definition of the average reward, one would find precisely the same value v. We also refer to Maitra and Sudderth [12] for the existence of the value in a very general setup.
Thus, in a zero-sum game, player 1 wants to maximize his own reward, while at the same time player 2 tries to minimize player 1's reward. For simplicity, let = 2 an -optimal strategy. For simplicity, 0-optimal strategies are briefly called optimal. Mertens and Neyman [13] proved (even in a stronger form) that both players have -optimal strategies for any > 0.
For the class of aperiodic zero-sum product-games, we will provide a proof that both players have stationary 0-optimal strategies (cf., Main Theorem 2). In addition, we analyse the structure of the value of these games.
The structure of the article. In §2, we will discuss preliminary concepts and results. Then, in §3, we will present and prove the two main theorems, and provide illustrative examples. Finally, §4 concludes with a short discussion on the case of periodic product-games.
Preliminary concepts and results.
Some of the content of this section is very similar to the decomposition presented in Ross and Varadarajan [15] for Markov decision problems (i.e., stochastic games with only one player).
Classification of states. As we know, in a product-game, each player i has a Markov transition structure i of his own. We start by analysing each i separately. We would like to emphasise that such a separate analysis is only possible because, in a product-game, each player affects the transitions of his own states only. We distinguish between two basic types of states in the state space [24, 25] , Solan and Vieille [19] , Solan [18] ).
This relationship of communication is an equivalence relation on the set of states of type 2. As such, it induces equivalence classes, which for obvious reasons are called maximal communicating sets. Therefore, every maximal communicating set E i has the properties that (1) player i can go from any state in E i to any other state in E i , possibly in a number of moves, without leaving E i with probability 1 and (2) if player i decides to leave E i , the probability that he ever comes back to E i is strictly less than 1, regardless of his strategy. The latter observation further implies that (3) the total number of times during the whole play that player i switches from a maximal communicating set to another one is finite with probability 1, regardless of the initial state and player i's strategy; (4) there is always at least one among the maximal communicating sets which player i is unable to leave; i.e., there are no transitions to states outside; (5) for any strategy of player i, regardless of the initial state, player i eventually settles, with probability 1, in one of his maximal communicating sets E i ; i.e., after finitely many stages, player i remains forever in E i (it is possible that player i would be able to leave E i with a different strategy). .) The importance of the notion of aperiodicity lies in the fact that for such a completely mixed stationary strategy, after sufficiently many stages, the system can be in any state s i ∈ E i k i with positive probability, regardless of the initial state in E i k i . We will call a product-game aperiodic if all maximal communicating sets, for all players, are aperiodic. From now on, we will only consider aperiodic product-games, with the exception of §4.
Restricted games. Take an aperiodic product-game and some k = k 1 k n ∈ K. By restricting the state space to E k ⊂ S, and the action set of each player i in any state s ∈ E k toĀ i s , we obtain a restricted game G k . Obviously, G k is an aperiodic product-game itself.
These restricted games play a key role in the analysis of product-games because of the following observation. As is pointed out above, for any initial state and strategy of the players, each player i eventually settles in one of his maximal communicating sets E i k i , with probability 1. Hence, with probability 1, play will eventually settle in a restricted game G k . The study of these restricted games is therefore of great importance.
For a restricted game G k , letv
s holds for all initial states s ∈ E k , then we call G k satisfactory to player i. Otherwise, G k is called unsatisfactory to player i. In words, if G k is satisfactory to player i, then player i weakly prefers G k to G, as far as his min max level is concerned on E k . Let K * denote the set of indices k ∈ K such that G k is satisfactory to all players. Further, let K i denote the set of indices k ∈ K such that G k is unsatisfactory to player i but satisfactory to all players j
As an illustration, consider the product-game with two players given in Figure 1 . This is a game with six states. In each state, the actions of player 1 are represented by the rows, and the actions of player 2 by the columns. Therefore, each cell of each state corresponds to a pair of actions. In each cell, the two payoffs to the respective players are given in the upper-left corner, while the next state is indicated in the bottom-right corner. In this game all the transitions are pure; i.e., each transition probability distribution assigns probability 1 to a certain state.
The underlying Markov transition structure for player 1 is given by state space S 1 = 1 2 3 , action sets A Later we will examine which restricted games are satisfactory to the players.
3. The main results and the proof.
3.1. The main theorems. For the class of aperiodic product-games, we present the following result concerning existence of equilibria.
Main Theorem 1. There exists a 0-equilibrium in every aperiodic n-player product-game.
The idea of the construction of an equilibrium , for an aperiodic product-game G, is as follows. The equilibrium will prescribe to follow a joint strategy , unless some player i deviates from i by playing an action outside the support of i (i.e., an action on which i puts probability zero). If player i deviates in such a way, then from the next state, say state s, players −i switch to a joint stationary strategy y −i and push down player i's reward to his min max level v i s . In fact, y −i acts as a threat strategy, whose task is to force player i to follow the prescriptions of i . Punishment with y −i will be shown to be severe enough. Finally, our construction will guarantee that no deviation inside the support of i (such deviations are hard to detect) is profitable for any player i. Now we briefly describe the construction of , which shows a number of similarities with the construction in Vieille [24, 25] . The joint strategy prescribes to play in the following way:
(1) When entering some E k , with k ∈ K * (i.e., the restricted game G k is satisfactory to all players): In this case, will prescribe to stay on E k and play a certain equilibrium in G k . Here, the players collect "high" payoffs (cf., solvable sets in Vieille [24, 25] .) (2) When entering some E k , with k ∈ K i (i.e., the restricted game G k is unsatisfactory to player i): In this case, will prescribe player i to exit E i k i (and thereby to leave E k ), while all other players patiently wait for player i's exit. It will be taken care of that no player's min max level drops in expectation. Payoffs in E k are disregarded (cf., controlled sets in Vieille [24, 25] ).
(3) Outside all joint maximal communicating sets: In this case, will let the players play for their future perspectives. Payoffs in these states are disregarded.
Note that, according to , play will surely settle in a restricted game belonging to case (1). In addition, for the special case of two-player zero-sum product-games, we show the existence of stationary solutions.
Main Theorem 2. In two-player aperiodic zero-sum product-games, both players have a stationary 0-optimal strategy.
3.2. The proofs of Main Theorems 1 and 2. In this section, we provide a proof for Main Theorems 1 and 2. We will focus on Main Theorem 1, as Main Theorem 2 will follow (cf., the end of §3.2.3) along the way without major additional difficulties. Since an equilibrium reward for player i, from any initial state s, is at least his min max level v i s , we start by studying the min max levels of product-games.
3.2.1. The structure of the min max levels of the restricted games. 
on F , once play reaches F , it will never leave it and, in view of (8), player i's reward will be at most i . Consequently, the min max levelv 
3.2.2.
The min max levels in simple product-games. We call a product-game G simple if it holds within any restricted game G k for any player i that all payoffs to player i are equal; i.e., for any k ∈ K and for any 
Proof. We only show part (1) of the lemma; part (2) can be proven similarly. Let > 0. 
As > 0 was arbitrary, the proof will then be complete.
Step 
From our assumption that (11) holds for m, from equality (10), and from the definition of −i , it follows that (11) holds for m + 1. Consequently, (11) holds for all m.
Recall that, with respect to any initial state and any joint strategy, play eventually settles, with probability 1, in a restricted game. By equality (11), the probability that this restricted game is some G k with respect to in equals the probability that this is G k with respect to in . Since the game is simple, the average reward is determined by this restricted game, and hence the expected reward for in equals the expected reward for in . This proves Property (c), and therefore the proof is complete. Proof. We will show part (1); the proof of part (2) Therefore, in state s, the infimum in equality (7) is attained at all a Consider a restricted game G k , within a simple product-game, which is unsatisfactory to player i (i.e., i ∈ K i ). The next lemma proposes a way for player i to exit G k . A similar result holds for players −i. Proof. We will prove part (1); the proof of part (2) 
where the inequality follows from part (2) of Lemma 3.2 and the equalities from part (2) 
which completes the proof of part (1). Example 2. Consider the simple product-game G with two players given in Figure 2 . This game is obtained from the game in Example 1 by replacing all payoffs for player 1 by 2 and for player 2 by −2 in the restricted game G I I , and all payoffs for either player by 0 in the restricted game G I II . Hence, the only possible pair of payoffs is 2 −2 , in G I I , and 0 0 in G I II . Finally, for restricted game G II I , the only possible pair of payoffs remains 0 0 while in G II II , it remains 1 −1 . So, the game is simple, indeed.
Let us examine the players' min max levels in G. For player 1, we will argue that
Player 1's min max level is clearly 0 for initial state 3 1 , in view of player 2's first action. Now consider another arbitrary initial state s ∈ S − 3 1 . By moving to his second state, player 2 can always make sure that player 1's reward is at most 1. On the other hand, player 1 can guarantee reward 1 for state s by the pure stationary strategy x 1 defined as
Hence, player 1's min max level equals 1 for all s ∈ S − 3 1 , indeed. We similarly find that v
With the help of this example, we will now illustrate some lemmas in this section. Regarding Lemma 3.2: Consider, for instance, a solitary move for player 1 in state 2 1 . Then, player 1's first action, as a solitary move, yields state 1 1 , while the second action yields state 3 1 . As v 3.2.3. The min max levels of general product-games. Take an arbitrary product-game G. The next lemma presents a natural way of transforming G into a simple product-game G, by replacing payoffs by min max levels, and claims that the min max levels of the players remain unchanged under this transformation. The idea to replace payoffs by min max levels also appeared in Solan [17] and in a more sophisticated way in Solan and Vohra [20] . Proof. Consider the original product-game G and take an arbitrary player i. For this game G, we will show below that players −i have a joint stationary strategy x −i which guarantees that player i's reward from any initial state s ∈ S is at most w First, consider an arbitrary ergodic set F for x i x −i . As players −i will leave any set E k considered in Case 3, we conclude that F ⊂ E k for some E k in Case 2. Since x i does not leave F , the mixed action 
for all s ∈ F . As F was an arbitrary ergodic set, we have 
where the first inequality follows from inequality (13) and from the fact that entry t s of the stochastic matrix Q x i x −i is only positive if state s is recurrent for x i x −i . Since x i is a best reply to x −i in G, the proof of (12) is complete.
For an illustration of the above lemma, we refer to the games in Examples 1 and 2. Indeed, the product-game in Example 1 (which is now game G with min max levels v) leads to the simple product-game in Example 2 (which is now game G with min max levels w . Just as in the proof of the above lemma, we can construct a stationary strategy y 1 for player 1 (y 1 being x −2 for players −i with i = 2) which guarantees in G that player 2's reward is not more than w satisfies all these requirements. The previous lemma (and its proof) has useful consequences. With the help of this corollary, we are now ready to prove Main Theorem 2, which claimed that, in every two-player aperiodic zero-sum product-game, both players have a stationary 0-optimal strategy.
Proof of Main Theorem 2. Take an arbitrary two-player aperiodic zero-sum product-game, and take player i = 1. By Corollary 3.3, there exists a stationary strategy x −1 for player 2 (as −1 = 2 ) which guarantees that player 1's reward is not more than v 1 s for any initial state s ∈ S. Hence, x −1 is 0-optimal for player 2. One finds similarly a stationary 0-optimal strategy for player 1, which completes the proof.
3.2.4. The construction of 0-equilibria in product-games. In the previous sections we achieved several results for the min max levels of aperiodic product-games. We will use this knowledge now to construct 0-equilibria in aperiodic product-games.
The following lemma states that, in any restricted game, there exists a 0-equilibrium in which, if no player deviates, the players' future expectations remain unchanged during the whole play. The reasoning remains valid for all irreducible stochastic games. Note, however, that Flesch et al. [7] (with 3 players) and Simon [16] (with only 2 players) constructed examples proving that such a result would not hold for all stochastic games in general.
Lemma 3.7. Let G be an arbitrary aperiodic product-game and consider the restricted game G k , for any Proof. Observe the following for the game G k .
(i) The set of feasible rewards (i.e., the rewards that can be obtained by some joint strategy) is the same from any initial state in E k . This is an immediate consequence of the fact that, as E k is an aperiodic joint maximal communicating set, the players can move from any state in E k to any other one in E k , possibly in a number of steps.
(ii) The extreme points of the set of feasible rewards are induced by pure stationary strategies. Indeed, for any extreme point z, Dutta [5] (cf., the appendix) shows that there exists a joint pure stationary strategy x which induces reward z for some fixed initial state s ∈ E k . As x = Q x x (as mentioned in (5)), s x is a convex combination of the rewards for x within the ergodic sets which can be reached from state s with a positive probability. Take such an ergodic set F ⊂ E k . Then, because of property (i) and the choice of z, the joint strategy x must yield reward z within F . Since E k is a joint maximal communicating set, there exists a joint pure stationary strategy y such that y coincides with x on F and, moreover, play reaches F from any initial state in E k . Clearly, y induces reward z from all initial states in E k .
(iii) Each min max level in G k is a constantv i k , by Lemma 3.1. Given these three observations, this game situation is almost identical to a repeated game. The following ideas and arguments are standard in Folk theorems for repeated games. For the context of stochastic games, we refer to Dutta [5] . Take an arbitrary feasible reward z k = z tends to 0, so that the average payoffs will fluctuate less and less. Because of these three properties, induces reward z k , and moreover, any continuation reward is also z k ; i.e., s h = z k for all states s ∈ E k and for all histories h. Let be the joint strategy which prescribes to play , unless some player i deviates from the action prescribed by i . In that case, from the new state, players −i should switch to a joint stationary strategy x −i as in Lemma 3.1. Since the players receive z k ≥v k according to , while if a player i deviates then his reward is not more thanv i k , the joint strategy is a 0-equilibrium and satisfies the requirements of the lemma. Now we are sufficiently prepared to prove Main Theorem 1, which claimed that, in any aperiodic productgame G, there exists a 0-equilibrium.
Proof of Main Theorem 1. For the idea of the construction, we refer to §3.1. Let S denote the set of states s = s 1 s n ∈ S in which s i is of type 1 for at least one player i. Recall that, on each E k , k ∈ K, the min max values in G and in G are both a constant v k andv k , respectively, due to Lemma 3.1 and Corollary 3.1.
In every restricted game G k with k ∈ K * , take a 0-equilibrium k as in Lemma 3.7. Let z i k denote the corresponding reward for any player i, which is independent of the initial state on E k . Then, as k ∈ K * , we have z The proof of Main Theorem 1 consists of the following steps. In Step 1, we construct a joint stationary strategy x * , which is used to reach the joint maximal communicating sets E k with k ∈ K * . Then, in Step 2 we "extend" x * to the joint strategy according to which the players also receive rewards z k in the sets E k , k ∈ K * . Finally, in Step 3, we will complete the proof by showing that supplemented with some joint stationary strategies y −i , for all i, forms a 0-equilibrium.
Step 1: The construction of the joint stationary strategy x * and a number of properties of x * . First, two supplementary games G and G * have to be constructed. Then, given G * , the joint strategy x * will be found as a stationary 0-equilibrium in G * . where R i m is the random variable for the payoff for player i at stage m, and where Ɛ sx stands for expectation with respect to initial state s and joint strategy x. Fink [9] and Takahashi [22] showed that, for every ∈ 0 1 , there exists a stationary 0-equilibrium with respect to the -discounted rewards.
As the ergodic sets are the same for all joint stationary strategies, it is known (cf., Lemma 2.7.6 in Flesch [6] ) that for any sequence of discount factors m converging to 1 and joint strategies x m converging to x we have 
for all states s ∈ S and players i.
We will now work with a number of sequences in compact spaces. By taking subsequences, we may assume that all these sequences have limits. Let m be a sequence of discount factors converging to 1, and for any m ∈ , let x m be a stationary m -discounted 0-equilibrium. Let x = lim m→ x m . We will show that x is a 0-equilibrium with respect to the average reward.
Take an arbitrary player i and a stationary best reply y i to x −i . Then for any initial state s ∈ S, from (19) and from the fact that x m is a m -discounted 0-equilibrium, it follows that As y i is a best reply to x −i , the joint strategy x is a stationary 0-equilibrium with respect to the average reward indeed.
